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Abstract—We present two physical layer secure transmis-
sion schemes for multi-user multi-relay networks, where the
communication from M users to the base station is assisted
by direct links and by N decode-and-forward relays. In this
network, we consider that a passive eavesdropper exists to
overhear the transmitted information, which entails exploiting
the advantages of both direct and relay links for physical layer
security enhancement. To fulfill this requirement, we investigate
two criteria for user and relay selection and examine the
achievable secrecy performance. Criterion I performs a joint user
and relay selection, while Criterion II performs separate user
and relay selections, with a lower implementation complexity.
We derive a tight lower bound on the secrecy outage probability
for Criterion I and an accurate analytical expression for the
secrecy outage probability for Criterion II. We further derive
the asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities at high transmit
signal-to-noise ratios and high main-to-eavesdropper ratios for
both criteria. We demonstrate that the secrecy diversity order
is min (MN;M +N) for Criterion I, and N for Criterion II.
Finally, we present numerical and simulation results to validate
the proposed analysis, and show the occurrence condition of the
secrecy outage probability floor.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, multi-user multi-relay
networks, direct links, secrecy outage probability, secrecy diver-
sity order.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the world of wireless communi-
cations has experienced unprecedented growth, driven by the
vast increase in the number of intelligent devices, the amount
of base stations (BSs), and the demand of multimedia con-
tent. Spurred by the ubiquitousness and necessity of wireless
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connections in the near future, an enormous volume of private
and sensitive information, e.g., financial data, medical records,
and customer files, will be wirelessly transmitted. It is widely
accepted that wireless communications are inherently insecure,
due to the broadcast nature of the medium. As such, providing
an unrivalled security service is one of the top priorities in the
design and implementation of the current and future wireless
networks.
Differing from the traditional key-based cryptographic tech-
niques, physical (PHY) layer security enhances the secrecy
of wireless communications by exploiting the characteristics
of wireless channels, without using secret keys and complex
encryption/decryption algorithms [1]. As the seminal work that
laid down the fundamentals of PHY layer security, the authors
in [2] introduced the wiretap channel as the basic model and
defined the secrecy capacity as the maximum rate at which
messages are reliably transmitted to the legitimate receiver,
without being intercepted by unintended parties. Inspired by
early studies, PHY layer security over fading channel has
been studied from both information-theoretic and practical
perspectives. For example, [3], [4] considered a single-input
single-output (SISO) wiretap channel over Rayleigh fading and
analyzed the secrecy capacity. Built upon these studies, PHY
layer security in multi-input multi-output (MIMO) commu-
nication systems has been intensively addressed, due to the
benefits of multi-antenna techniques, such as high data rate
and high link reliability. For instance, several MIMO secure
techniques have been investigated, such as beamforming (e.g.,
[5]–[7]), precoding (e.g., [8]), artificial noise (e.g., [9]), and
antenna selection (e.g., [10]–[12]).
Recently, PHY layer security in relay networks has attracted
considerable attention, due to the fact that cooperative relaying
is envisioned as a very promising technique to enhance the
performance of the next-generation wireless communication
networks [13]–[19]. In secure communications, researchers
have investigated traditional relaying protocols [20]–[28], such
as amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF),
where DF can be further specified as fixed DF and selective DF
[29]1. For example, [21] employed relay selection to enhance
secrecy in a multi-AF-relay network and adopted the intercept
probability as the secrecy performance metric. In [22]–[24], a
selective-DF based multi-relay network was considered and
one relay out of multiple relays was selected for secrecy
improvement. Note that a common feature of [21]–[24] is
1Compared with selective-DF relaying, fixed-DF relaying does not need
additional feedback caused by notification, and hence is easier to implement in
practice [29]. In the following, we use DF to denote fixed-DF if not specified.
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that the direct link between the source and the destination
(or the eavesdropper) is unavailable. To investigate the impact
of the direct link on the secrecy performance, [25] studied the
performance of relay selection in a fixed-DF based multi-relay
network with maximal ratio combining (MRC) receiver, where
the available direct link between the source and receiver is not
involved in the system relay selection. Considering multiple
relays used to facilitate the downlink of multi-user networks,
[26] and [27] analyzed the secrecy performance for AF-relay
and selective-DF-relay selection, respectively. Besides these
works, the secure communications of full-duplex relay and
large systems were also investigated in the literature [30]–[33].
This paper lays the groundwork for understanding the role
of the direct link on the PHY layer security in the uplink
of multi-user multi-relay networks, which stands as a major
advancement over [26] and [27] which focused on the down-
link2. We investigate secure user and relay selection schemes
and analyze the achievable secrecy performance of the uplink
where N fixed-DF relays assist the communication from M
users to the BS. The BS adopts MRC to process the received
signals through both the direct link and the relay link. We
assume that a passive eavesdropper exists in this network to
overhear the transmitted information. We note that although
selective-DF based multiuser multi-relay networks have been
extensively investigated, e.g., [27], [34], [35], fixed-DF based
multiuser multi-relay networks with an MRC receiver have not
been analyzed in the literature, regardless of secure or non-
secure communications. The key contributions of this paper
are summarized as follow:
 We propose two user and relay selection criteria that
select the best user and relay pair, to exploit the ad-
vantages of both direct and relay links for PHY layer
security enhancement. In Criterion I, a joint user and relay
selection is performed to maximize the data rate of the
main links, from the selected user to the BS. In Criterion
II, separate user and relay selections are performed, based
on direct and relay links, respectively, which reduces the
implementation complexity.
 We derive novel expressions for the secrecy outage prob-
ability, in order to investigate the secrecy performance
achieved by the proposed criteria. For Criterion I, we de-
rive a tight lower bound on the secrecy outage probability,
whereas for Criterion II, we present an accurate analytical
expression.
 We present new results for the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability for both criteria. These asymptotic expres-
sions enable us to determine the main factors that regulate
the secrecy performance in the transmit high signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) and the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio
(MER) regimes.
 Based on the asymptotic results, we demonstrate that
2We clarify that there are several significant differences between this
paper and [26] and [27]. First, the relaying protocol is different. This paper
considers the fixed-DF relaying protocol whereas [26] and [27] consider AF
and selective-DF relaying, respectively. Second, this paper exploits the direct
link in both user selection and relay selection, whereas [26] did not consider
the direct link and [27] performed the relay selection without using the direct
link. These differences make the results of this paper fundamentally different
from those in [26] and [27].
Criterion I achieves the secrecy diversity order of
min (MN;M +N), while Criterion II achieves the se-
crecy diversity order of N . Notably, the number of users
does not affect the secrecy diversity order for Criterion
II. With the help of simulations, we verify our analysis
and investigate the impact of the network parameters on
the secrecy performance.
 Finally, we show that the secrecy outage probability floor
occurs when the transmit power increases and the MER
of either direct link or relay link is fixed.
The organization of this paper is as follows. After the in-
troduction, Section II describes the model of a two-phase
uplink multi-user multi-relay network and details the proposed
criteria for user and relay selection. Section III presents the
secrecy outage probabilities for the two criteria, including
the derivations for both the exact and asymptotic results.
Numerical results are provided in Section IV to offer valuable
insights into the secrecy performance. Conclusions are drawn
in Section V.
Notation: X  CN (0; 2) denotes a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variable X with zero mean and
variance 2; Pr [] is the probability; fX() and FX() rep-
resent the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the random variable X , respec-
tively.
II. USER AND RELAY SELECTION IN MULTI-USER
MULTI-RELAY NETWORK
A. The Multi-user Multi-relay Network Model
Let us consider a secure multi-user multi-relay network,
as depicted in Fig. 1, where the communication between M
users Sm, m 2 f1;    ;Mg, and the BS D is assisted by
N DF relays Rn, n 2 f1;    ; Ng3. In practice, this model
represents the uplink of a multi-user cellular system with
multiple relays, which assist the user–BS transmission. We
assume that an eavesdropper E 4 exists in this network and
overhears the transmitted messages, bringing out the important
issue of information wiretap. We further assume that all nodes
in the network are equipped with a single antenna, due to
the size limitation, and operate in a half-duplex time-division
mode.
To enhance the transmission security, both user selection
and relay selection will be performed in this work to select
one best user Sm among M users to communicate with
D, with the help of a selected Rn out of N relays5. In
practice, user selection can be applied in a multiuser LTE-
Advanced cellular system to improve the system throughput
3We assume that the M users are relatively close together and in the same
cluster, which have the same distance to the other nodes in the network. This
assumption also holds for the N relays.
4If multiple eavesdroppers exist in the network, the secrecy performance
will be degraded. This is caused by an increase in the success probability of
eavesdropping, i.e., either by the best eavesdropper with the most favorable
channel condition or by the collaboration of multiple eavesdroppers.
5The residual users and relays are assumed to keep silent in this work. In
some communication systems [24], [25], [28], [36], the residual users and
relays can send jamming signals to confuse the eavesdropper, at the cost of
an increased implementation complexity. The transmission of jamming signals
will be addressed in future work.
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION ON IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. X, NO. XX, XXXXX 2016 3
Eavesdropper link
Main link
First phase 
Second phase 
E
DSm
S1
SM
User cluster 
Rn
R1
RN
DF relay cluster 
Fig. 1. The illustration of a two-phase secure multi-user multi-relay network
with direct links.
[37], [38], whereas relay selection is feasible in IEEE 802.12j
vehicular networks to improve the system capacity [34], [39].
We further assume that the direct link between the source and
the destination is available. The adoption of this assumption is
not to complicate the system model, but to address a practical
scenario in wireless cellular networks. In practice, the direct
link is available if the source and the destination are not
placed remotely, or the destination does not fall within heavily
shadowed areas. Motivated by this practicality, the impact of
the direct link on the performance of relay-aided wireless
systems has been examined in [34], [35] and [40]–[42]. Since
the direct links can affect both the legitimate transmission and
the illegitimate wiretap, the impact of both direct and relay
links on the user and relay selection has to be considered for
the secure transmission. To present the relay and user selection
criteria, we first detail the two-phase transmission process, as
follow:
Suppose that the user Sm and the relay Rn have been
selected for data transmission. In the first phase, Sm sends
the encoded signal of unit-variance, xs, with transmit power
P . The received signal at Rn, D, and E in the first phase are
given by
yRn = hSm;Rn
p
Pxs + nR; (1)
y
(1)
D = hSm;D
p
Pxs + n
(1)
D ; (2)
y
(1)
E = hSm;E
p
Pxs + n
(1)
E ; (3)
respectively, where hSm;Rn  CN (0; ), hSm;D  CN (0; "1),
and hSm;E  CN (0; "2) denote the channel coefficients of the
Sm–Rn link, Sm–D link, and Sm–E link, respectively. We
also denote nR  CN (0; 2), n(1)D  CN (0; 2), and n(1)E 
CN (0; 2) as the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at
Rn, D, and E in the first phase. If Rn correctly decodes
the message received in the first phase, it then re-encodes the
signal with the same code book at Sm and forwards it to D in
the second phase. Accordingly, the received signal at D and
E in the second phase are given by
y
(2)
D = hRn;D
p
Pxs + n
(2)
D (4)
y
(2)
E = hRn;E
p
Pxs + n
(2)
E ; (5)
respectively, where hRn;D  CN (0; 1) and hRn;E 
CN (0; 2) denote the channel coefficients of the Rn–D
link and Rn–E link, respectively. We also denote n
(2)
D 
CN (0; 2) and n(2)E  CN (0; 2) as the AWGN at D and E,
respectively, in the second phase. Here, although we assume
that the selected relay has the same transmit power as the
selected user, we highlight that this assumption does not lose
generality. We denote umn = jhSm;Rn j2, v1n = jhRn;Dj2,
v2n = jhRn;E j2, w1m = jhSm;Dj2, and w2m = jhSm;E j2 as
the channel gains of the Sm–Rn link, Rn–D link, Rn–E link,
Sm–D link, and Sm–E link, respectively. The end-to-end SNR
at D for the repetition-coded fixed DF relaying can be written
as [29, Eq. (15)]
SNRD = min (umn; v1n + w1m) ; (6)
where  = P=2 is the transmit SNR. According to [25],
[43], we note that the secrecy outage occurs when the system
achievable secrecy data rate falls below a predetermined
secrecy rate Rs, i.e.,
1
2
log2 (1 + min (umn; v1n + w1m))
  1
2
log2 (1 +  (v2n + w2m)) < Rs: (7)
After some mathematical manipulations, we re-express (7) as
1 + min (umn; v1n + w1m)
1 +  (v2n + w2m)
< s; (8)
where s = 22Rs is the secrecy SNR threshold.
B. User and Relay Selection Criteria
We consider a practical passive eavesdropping scenario,
where only the statistical information of the eavesdropper’s
channel is known, while the instantaneous information of the
eavesdropper’s channel is unknown. This indicates that the
eavesdropper’s channel coefficients, i.e., hSm;E and hRn;E ,
are not available at the users, relays, and BS. Accordingly,
the values of v2n and w2m are not known and thus cannot be
involved in the selection criterion. We highlight that the pas-
sive eavesdropping scenario is a practical consideration since
in practice the eavesdropper is generally not cooperative and
not willing to feedback its instantaneous channel coefficients
to the legitimate nodes. Moreover, the assumption of known
statistical information of the eavesdropper’s channel applies
to the scenario where the eavesdropper is part of a multiuser
system which in alternate time slots it becomes an active legiti-
mate participant in the system. As such, the eavesdropper feeds
back its channel state information to the transmitter for the
time slot where it is being served. From this information, and
assuming that the eavesdropper is static (or moving slowly),
the statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel in the
time slots where it is not being served can be derived. Under
this consideration, we propose two user and relay selection
criteria that select the best user and relay pair to carry out
the secure transmission in the network. These criteria are
described as follow:
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION ON IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. X, NO. XX, XXXXX 2016 4
1) Criterion I: In this criterion, the joint user and relay
selection is performed by maximizing the achievable rate of
the main links. Mathematically, the indices of the selected user
and the relay are expressed as
(m; n) = arg max
1mM
max
1nN
min (umn; v1n + w1m) : (9)
This criterion achieves the optimal secrecy performance in the
passive eavesdropping scenario. We clarify that an assumption
adopted in (9) is that the eavesdropper has the same average
channel gain to the users and the relays. If we consider the
scenario where the eavesdropper has different average channel
gains to the users and the relays, the statistical information of
eavesdropper’s channel needs to be taken into account in the
selection criterion. Specifically, the selection in this scenario
cannot be performed by maximizing the data rate of main link,
but can be performed by maximizing 1+min(umn;v1n+w1m)1+(E[v2n]+E[w2m]) ,
where E[] denotes the statistical expectation.
In Criterion I, the term w1m from the direct link is incor-
porated into the term min(umn; v1n) from the relay links. As
such, the two terms cannot be separated from each other. It
follows that Criterion I is a joint selection scheme where the
user selection interacts with the relay selection.
2) Criterion II: Differing from Criterion I, Criterion II
involves separate user and relay selections. Specifically, the
best user is firstly selected based on the direct links [44], and
then the best relay is selected based on the two-hop relay
links [45]. The indices of the selected user and the relay can
be expressed as
m = arg max
1mM
w1m; (10)
and
n = arg max
1nN
min (umn; v1n) : (11)
It is evident from (10) and (11) that user selection and relay
selection are performed separately in Criterion II. Compared
with Criterion I which needs an adder and a comparator to
perform joint selection, Criterion II only requires a simple
comparator to perform separate selections, bringing about a
lower implementation complexity. Hence, our work provides a
flexible choice for system design as follows: If the system has
a powerful computational capability, Criterion I is preferred
to achieve the best secrecy performance; otherwise Criterion
II can be used to reduce the implementation complexity.
We next detail the channel estimation procedure for both
criteria. At the beginning of each transmission block, the
network needs to determine which pair of user and relay is
selected for data transmission. To this end, we assume that
D estimates the required channel coefficients of main links
with the help of pilot signals from users and relays. Then
D performs user selection and relay selection according to
either Criterion I or Criterion II, and notifies the indices of the
selected user and relay through dedicated feedback channels.
After selection, the two-phase data transmission commences
at the selected user Sm and relay Rn .
Based on (8), the secrecy outage probability with the
selected user Sm and relay Rn is given by
Pout = Pr

1 + min (umn ; v1n + w1m)
1 +  (v2n + w2m)
< s

;
= Pr [Z < s (v2n + w2m) + 
0
s] ; (12)
where 0s = (s   1)= and Z , min (umn ; v1n + w1m).
Evidently, the statistical characterization of Z is the key for
the evaluation of Pout.
III. ANALYSIS OF SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we derive new exact and asymptotic expres-
sions for the secrecy outage probability, where both criteria
are considered.
A. A Tight Lower Bound for Criterion I
For Criterion I, we first rewrite Z as
Z = max
1mM
max
1nN
min (umn; v1n + w1m) : (13)
From (13), we can conclude that Z is the maximum of
M N non-independent variables, fmin (umn; v1n + w1m)g.
This is due to the fact that M users share the common
variable v1n, while N relays share the common variable w1m.
Moreover, we see that the variable w1m from the direct link
affects both relay selection and user selection. This makes
the mathematical derivation for the fixed-DF based multi-user
multi-relay networks much more complicated than that for
AF or selective-DF based multi-user multi-relay networks6.
Therefore, it is mathematical difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain an exact analytical expression for the secrecy outage
probability for Criterion I. Motivated by this, we turn to derive
two upper bounds on Z by exchanging the sequence of max
and min operations. The first upper bound is given by
Z1 = max
1mM
min

max
1nN
(umn; v1n + w1m)

= max
1mM
min

max
1nN
umn;

max
1nN
v1n

+ w1m

;
(14)
and the second upper bound by
Z2 = max
1nN
min

max
1mM
(umn; v1n + w1m)

= max
1nN
min

max
1mM
umn; v1n + max
1mM
(w1m)

:
(15)
Built upon Z1 in (14) and Z2 in (15), we next derive the
lower bounds on the secrecy outage probability, i.e., PLB1;out
and PLB2;out. We note that Z1 is effective only when the relay
selection does not dominate the joint user and relay selection,
while Z2 is effective only when the user selection does not
6For AF [26] or selective-DF based multi-user multi-relay networks with
direct links [27], [35], [42], [46], the system relay selection is based on the
two-hop relay links only with a given user Sm. This indicates that the direct
links have no impact on the relay selection. Hence, the mathematical derivation
in these studies cannot be applied to the proposed work.
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION ON IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. X, NO. XX, XXXXX 2016 5
dominate the joint selection. Hence, the maximal value of
PLB1;out and P
LB
2;out provides a very tight lower bound on the
secrecy outage probability, which will be demonstrated by the
numerical and simulation results in Section IV.
We now begin to derive PLB1;out associated with Z1. Let
v1 = max
1nN
v1n; (16)
um = max
1nN
umn; (17)
and then we rewrite Z1 as
Z1 = max
1mM
min (um; v1 + w1m)| {z }
Z1m
: (18)
From (18), Z1m is correlated with each other, because of the
common variable v1. To deal with this, we first derive the
conditional CDF of Z1m with respect to v1, i.e., FZ1m (zjv1).
By statistically averaging FMZ1m (zjv1) with respect to v1, we
then obtain the analytical CDF of Z1, i.e., FZ1 (z). We further
statistically average FZ1 (s(v2n + w2m) + 
0
s) with respect
to both v2n and w2m to obtain PLB1;out. The CDF of Z1 is
derived and presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The CDF of Z1 can be expressed as
FZ1 (z) =
NX
n1=1
MNX
n2=0
b1;n1;n2e
 c1;n1;n2z
+
MX
m=0
NX
n=1
]X
fig
q1ib2;m;n

e q2iz   e (q2i+c2;m;n)z

;
(19)
where
b1;n1;n2 = ( 1)n1+n2+1

N
n1

MN
n2

;
c1;n1;n2 =
n1
1
+
n2

;
]X
fig
=
mX
i1=0
i1X
i2=0
  
iN 2X
iN 1=0
;
q1i =

m
i1

i1
i2

  

iN 2
iN 1

bm i13;1 b
i1 i2
3;2    biN 2 iN 13;N 1 biN 13;N
b3;n =

N
n

( 1)n 1;
b2;m;n = ( 1)m+n 1

N
n

M
m

n"1
n"1  m1 ;
q2i =c3;1(m  i1) + c3;2(i1   i2) +   
+ c3;N 1(iN 2   iN 1) + c3;N iN 1;
c3;n =
n

+
1
"1
;
and
c2;m;n =
n
1
  m
"1
:
Proof 1: See Appendix A.
From Theorem 1 and eq. (12), we can derive the first lower
bound of Pout as
PLB1;out =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FZ1 (s(v2n + w2m) + 
0
s)
 fv2n (v2n)fw2m (w2m)dv2ndw2m : (20)
By using the PDF of v2n , given by fv2n (x) =
1
2
e 
x
2 , and
the PDF of w2m , given by fw2m (x) =
1
"2
e 
x
"2 , and solving
the integral in (20), we derive PLB1;out as
PLB1;out =
NX
n1=1
MNX
n2=0
b1;n1;n2L(c1;n1;n2)
+
MX
m=0
NX
n=1
]X
fig
q1ib2;m;n (L(q2i)  L(q2i + c2;m;n)) ;
(21)
where L(x) is defined as
L(x) = e
 0sx
(1 + 2sx)(1 + "2sx)
: (22)
The second lower bound of Pout, PLB2;out, has the same form
as PLB1;out in (21) after replacing M with N and 1 with "1.
This is because of the symmetry existed in (14) and (15).
Finally, the tight lower bound on the secrecy outage probability
for Criterion I can be obtained as
PLBout = max
 
PLB1;out; P
LB
2;out

: (23)
We highlight that (23) consists of elementary functions only,
and as such, it can be easily evaluated.
B. Exact Formula for Criterion II
To derive the secrecy outage probability for Criterion II, we
first derive the CDFs of w1m , umn , and v1n , as per the
selection criterion characterized by eqs. (10) and (11), and then
we obtain the CDF of Z, FZ (z). Furthermore, by averaging
FZ (z) with respect to w2m and v2n , we derive an exact
expression for Pout.
Theorem 2: The CDF of Z can be expressed by
FZ (z) = 1 
MX
m=1
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0

t1;n1t3;m;n2e
  z + t2;n1t3;m;n2
 e (
n1+1
 +
1
1
)z + t1;n1t4;m;n2e
 ( 1+m"1 )z
+ t1;n1t5;m;n2e
 ( 1+
n2+1
 )z + t2;n1t4;m;n2
e (
n1+1
 +
m
"1
)z + t2;n1t5;m;n2e
 (n1+n2+2 )z
i
;
(24)
where
 =
1
+ 1
;
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION ON IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. X, NO. XX, XXXXX 2016 6
t1;n =
b4;n
 + n1
;
t2;n = b4;n

1
n+ 1
  
 + n1

;
t3;m;n = ( 1)m 1

M
m

b4;nm1
( + n) (m1   "1) ;
t4;m;n =( 1)m 1

M
m

1
N
  b4;nm1
( + n) (m1   "1)
 b4;n

1
n+ 1
  
 + n

m
m   (n+ 1)"1

;
t5;m;n = ( 1)m 1

M
m

1
n+ 1
  
 + n

b4;nm
m   (n+ 1)"1 ;
and
b4;n = N( 1)n

N   1
n

:
Proof 2: See Appendix B.
From Theorem 2 and (12), we can now derive an exact
expression for Pout as
Pout =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FZ (s(v2n + w2m) + 
0
s)
 fv2n (v2n)fw2m (w2m)dv2ndw2m : (25)
By using the PDFs fv2n (x) and fw2m (x) and solving the
integral involved in (25), we further express Pout as
Pout =1 
MX
m=1
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0

t1;n1t3;m;n2L

1


+ t2;n1t3;m;n2
 L

n1 + 1

+
1
1

+ t1;n1t4;m;n2L

1

+
m
"1

+ t1;n1t5;m;n2L

1

+
n2 + 1


+ t2;n1t4;m;n2
 L

n1 + 1

+
m
"1

+ t2;n1t5;m;n2L

n1 + n2 + 2


:
(26)
Notably, (26) only consists of elementary functions and thus,
can be easily evaluated.
C. Asymptotic Pout for Criterion I
We now derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
for Criterion I, in the presence of high transmit SNRs and
MERs. Using the approximation of e x ' 1   x for small
value of jxj, the asymptotic CDF of Z1 can be written as,
Theorem 3: The asymptotic CDF of Z1 can be expressed
by
FZ1(z) '
M;Nz
M+N
"M1 
N
1
+
 z

MN
; (27)
where
M;N =
8>>>><>>>>:
MX
m=0

M
m

1
m+ 1
 z

M m
; If N = 1;
MX
m=0
( 1)mN
m+N

M
m

; If N  2:
:
(28)
Proof 3: See Appendix C.
From the asymptotic expression for FZ1(z), we can com-
pute the asymptotic secrecy outage probability associated with
Z1 as
P1;out '
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FZ1 (s(v2n + w2m) + 
0
s) fv2n (v2n)
 fw2m (w2m)dv2ndw2m
'
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FZ1 (s(v2n + w2m)) fv2n (v2n)
 fw2m (w2m)dv2ndw2m
'
M+N
s (M +N)!M;N
M1 
N
2
M+NX
k=0

2
"2
M k
+
MNs (MN)!
MN2

1

MN MNX
k=0

"2
2
MN k
; (29)
where 1 = "1"2 and 2 =
1
2
are the MERs for the direct and
relay links, respectively. Due to the symmetry between Z1
and Z2, we can readily obtain the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability associated with Z2, which has the same form as
(29) after replacing M with N and 1 with "1.
From these two asymptotic expressions, we conclude
that the secrecy diversity order for Criterion I is equal to
min (MN;M +N). This reveals that the security of the net-
work can be significantly improved by increasing the number
of users or the number of relays. In addition, we provide some
valuable insights in the following two remarks:
Remark 1: For a single user or single relay communication
system, the secrecy diversity order is MN . In particular, the
secrecy diversity order is M for a single relay system with
N = 1. This is due to the fact that only multi-user diversity
can be exploited. On the other hand, the secrecy diversity order
is N for a single user system with M = 1, since only the
multi-relay diversity can be exploited.
Remark 2: For a multi-user and multi-relay communication
system with M  2 and N  2, the secrecy diversity order
is equivalent to M + N . This indicates that both multi-user
diversity and multi-relay diversity can be fully exploited for
secure communication.
D. Asymptotic Pout for Criterion II
Using the Taylor’s series approximation of e x given by
[47]
e x ' 1  x+ x
2
2
+   + ( x)
N
N !
; (30)
the asymptotic CDF of Z can be written as,
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Theorem 4: The asymptotic CDF of Z can be expressed by
FZ (z) '

1
+ 1

zN
N
; (31)
Proof 4: See Appendix D.
From this asymptotic CDF, we compute the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability for Criterion II as
Pout '
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FZ (s(v2n + w2m) + 
0
s) fv2n (v2n)
 fw2m (w2m)dv2ndw2m
'
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FZ (s(v2n + w2m)) fv2n (v2n)
 fw2m (w2m)dv2ndw2m
'
N
s N !
N2

1 +

1
N 1 NX
n=0

"2
2
n
: (32)
From the asymptotic secrecy outage probability in (32), we
provide some valuable insights in the following two remarks:
Remark 1: Criterion II achieves the secrecy diversity order
of N , which comes from the multi-relay diversity. This indi-
cates that the multi-user diversity is not efficiently exploited in
Criterion II. In particular, increasing the number of users does
not affect the secrecy diversity order nor the secrecy coding
gain of Criterion II. This can be explained by the fact that the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability is irrespective of M .
Remark 2: The secrecy performance of the network can
be significantly enhanced by increasing the number of relays.
This can be explained by the fact that the relay links are the
bottleneck of the secure transmission in Criterion II.
Observing the analytical and asymptotic results presented
in (23), (26), (29) and (32), it is easy to find that our analysis
is developed based on the statistical information of eavesdrop-
ping channels. This indicates that the statistical information of
the eavesdropping channels is utilized to evaluate the secrecy
outage probabilities for Criterion I and II.
IV. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical and simulation results
to verify the presented analysis of the proposed selection
criteria and to examine the impact of the network parameters
on the secrecy outage probability. Throughout this section, we
assume that all links in the network experience Rayleigh flat
fading 7. Without loss of generality, the distance between the
users and the BS is set to unity, and the relays are placed
between in them. Let d denote the distance from the users to
relay. Accordingly, the average channel gains of the main links
are set to  = d 4, 1 = (1  d) 4 and "1 = 1, where the
path-loss model with a loss factor of 4 is used. The secrecy
data rate Rs is set to 0:2 bps/Hz and thus, the secrecy SNR
threshold s is equal to 1.32.
7The system secrecy performance will be affected if other channel scenarios
are considered. For example, if we assume that the main channel experiences
Nakagami-m fading with m = 3 (i.e., less severe fading), the achieved
secrecy performance will be improved. Of course, we highlight that our
developed analytical framework for secrecy performance evaluation in this
paper is still valid even if a different channel scenario is considered.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus  for d = 0:5 and 1 = 2 = 20
dB.
Figs. 2(a) and 2(b) plot the secrecy outage probabilities for
Criterion I and II versus the transmit SNR  for d = 0:5
and 1 = 2 = 20 dB. As observed from both figures,
the analytical result for each criterion perfectly matches the
corresponding simulation over the entire SNR regime for
various values of M and N . This demonstrates the tightness
of the lower bound derived for Criterion I and the correctness
of the exact result proposed for Criterion II. Moreover, it is
seen that the secrecy outage probability improves with the
transmit SNR in the low SNR regime, but this improvement
becomes saturated in the medium and high SNR regime. This
is due to the fact that the MER is the bottleneck of the
secrecy performance of the network. Furthermore, an increase
in the number of relays brings a profound improvement in the
secrecy outage probabilities for both criteria, which is due to
the fact that the multi-relay diversity indeed helps the secure
transmission for both of them. In addition, we can conclude
that an increase in the number of users brings a profound
improvement in the secrecy outage probability for Criterion I,
but a minor improvement for Criterion II. This phenomenon
can be explained by the fact that in Criterion II, the first hop of
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION ON IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. X, NO. XX, XXXXX 2016 8
 
 
10
−9
10
−8
10
−6
10
−4
10
−2
10
0
S
ec
re
cy
 O
u
ta
g
e 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Simulation
Lower bound
Simulation
Exact
Criterion II:
Criterion I:
Asymptotic
Asymptotic
M = 1
M = 2
M = 3
M = 1
M = 2
M = 3
MER       (dB)λ1 
(a) Impact of various M on the secrecy outage probability for
N = 2.
 
 
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
10
−9
10
−8
10
−6
10
−4
10
−2
10
0
S
ec
re
cy
 O
u
ta
g
e 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Simulation
Lower bound
Simulation
Exact
Criterion II:
Criterion I:
Asymptotic
Asymptotic
MER       (dB)λ1 
(b) Impact of variousN on the secrecy outage probability forM =
2.
Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus MER for d = 0:5,  = 30 dB,
and 1 = 2.
the relay link umn is the bottleneck of the received SNR at
the destination, min(umn ; v1n + w1m). This bottleneck
will not be improved profoundly by increasing the number
of users, since the best user selected based on direct links is
treated as a random user in the first hop of relay link.
Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) plot the secrecy outage probabilities
for Criterion I and II versus the MER 1 for d = 0:5,
 = 30 dB, and 1 = 2. To obtain the simulation results
as low as 10 8 with M = 2 and N = 3 for Criterion I,
we perform 1011 Monte Carlo runs. From both figures, the
asymptotic result for each criterion accurately approximates
the corresponding simulation result in the high MER regime
for various values of M and N . This validates our asymptotic
results derived for Criteria I and II. Moreover, the secrecy
diversity order increases with N for both criteria. This implies
that increasing the number of relays significantly improves the
secrecy outage probability, especially in the medium and high
MER regime. In contrast, the secrecy diversity order increases
with M for Criterion I, but remains unchanged for Criterion
II, as indicated by our asymptotic results. This implies that
increasing the number of users leads to a prominent reduction
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability versus MER for d = 0:5,  = 30 dB,
and 2 = 30 dB.
in the secrecy outage probability for Criterion I, but a minor
reduction in the secrecy outage probability for Criterion II.
Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) plot the secrecy outage probabilities
for Criterion I and II versus the MER 1 for d = 0:5,
 = 30 dB, and 2 = 30 dB. Again, here the accuracy of
our asymptotic results in the high MER regime for various
values ofM andN . Moreover, we see that the network secrecy
performance profoundly improves with 1 in the low and
medium MER regime. Furthermore, we see that the network
exhibits a secrecy performance floor in the high MER regime
for both criteria. This is caused because that the relay links
are the bottleneck of the secure transmission, when the MER
of relay links is fixed.
Fig. 5 compares Criterion I and II with the selection
schemes in [23] and [24] by plotting the secrecy outage proba-
bility versus the MER 1 with d = 0:2,  = 30 dB, 1 = 2,
and M = N = 2. Recall that in [23] and [24], user and
relay selection is performed by maximizing min(umn; v1n)
and (w1m + v1n), respectively. From Fig. 5 we find that the
secrecy outage probabilities of Criterion I and II are lower
than the secrecy outage probabilities of the schemes in [23]
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison of selection schemes versus MER for d =
0:2, 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and [24]. This is due to the fact that the system model and the
relay protocol considered in [23] and [24] are different from
those in our paper, leading to that the selection criteria in [23]
and [24] cannot efficiently optimize the system performance.
Hence, our proposed selection schemes outperform those in
[23] and [24].
From Figs. 2–5 we find that the derived lower bound on
the secrecy outage probability in Criterion I perfectly matches
the simulation result over the entire regime of transmit SNR
and MER. We also find that the matching is valid for various
numbers of users and relays. This matching demonstrates the
accuracy of the derived lower bound for Criterion I.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we addressed the problem of secure communi-
cation in the multi-user and multi-relay network, where direct
links from the users to the BS and from the users to the eaves-
dropper affect both information transmission and information
wiretap. Taking into account the effect of both direct and
relay links, we proposed two user and relay selection criteria
that select one best user and relay pair to improve secure
communication. For each criterion, we derived new analytical
expressions for the secrecy outage probability. We confirmed
from the asymptotic expressions that Criterion I achieves the
secrecy diversity order of M + N for M  2 and N  2,
while Criterion II achieves the secrecy diversity order of N
with a low implementation cost. Simulation results were also
provided to validate the proposed analysis and to examine the
impact of the network parameters on the secrecy performance.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To derive the CDF of Z1, we first derive the conditional
CDF of Z1m with respect to v1 as
FZ1m (zjv1) = Pr [min (um; v1 + w1m) < z]
= 1  Pr [um  z]  Pr [v1 + w1m  z] : (33)
Due to the fact that um = max1nN umn, the CDF of um
is given by [48]
Fum(x) =
 
1  e  x N : (34)
Accordingly, we obtain Pr [um  z] as
Pr [um  z] = 1 
 
1  e  z N : (35)
To derive FZ1m (zjv1), we consider Pr [v1 + w1m  z] for
two cases, namely, z < v1 and z  v1. When z < v1, v1+w1m
is always larger than z. As such, we obtain
FZ1m(zjv1) = (1  e 
z
 )N : (36)
On the other hand, when z  v1, we have
Pr [v1 + w1m  z] = Pr [w1m  z   v1] (37)
= e 
z v1
"1 : (38)
Accordingly, we obtain
FZ1m(zjv1) = 1  (1  e 
z
 )Ne 
z v1
"1
= 1  e
v1
"1
NX
n=0

N
n

( 1)n 1e (n+ 1"1 )z: (39)
From (36) and (39), the CDF of Z1 can be written as
FZ1(z) =
Z 1
0
FMZ1m(zjv1)fv1(v1)dv1
=
Z z
0
FMZ1m(zjv1)fv1(v1)dv1
+
Z 1
z
FMZ1m(zjv1)fv1(v1)dv1: (40)
By using the PDF of v1, given by fv1(x) =PN
n=1( 1)n 1
 
N
n

n
1
e 
nx
1 , and the binomial expansion
into (40), we obtain the desired CDF of Z1 as shown in (19)
of Theorem 1, which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since w1m is the maximum of M variables fw1mj1 
m Mg, as per the selection criterion characterized by (10),
it holds that its distribution is given by [48]
fw1m (x) =
MX
m=1
( 1)m 1

M
m

m
"1
e 
mx
"1 : (41)
We next derive the CDF of umn and v1n , as per the
selection criterion characterized by (11). We first write the
CDF of umn as
Fumn (x) = Pr [umn < x]
=
NX
n=1
Pr [umn < x;min(umn; v1n) > n] ;
(42)
where n is defined as
n = max
n1=1;N;n1 6=n
min(umn1 ; v1n1): (43)
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Due to the symmetry among N end-to-end paths, Fumn (x)
in (42) is written as
Fumn (x) =N Pr [um1 < x; um1 > 1; v11 > 1]
=N
Z x
0
Z x
1
Z 1
1
f1(1)fum1(um1)
 fv11(v11)dv11dum1d1: (44)
We first note that um1 and v11 follow exponential distribution
with mean  and 1, respectively. We also note that the CDF
of 1 is given by
F1(x) = Pr [1 < x]
= (Pr [min(um2; v12) < x])
N 1
=
N 1X
n=0
( 1)n

N   1
n

e 
nx
 ; (45)
where  = 1=( + 1). By applying these results and
solving the integral in (44), we obtain Fumn (x) as
Fumn (x) =1 
N 1X
n=0
b4;n


 + n1
e 
x

+

1
n+ 1
  
 + n1

e 
(n+1)x


; (46)
where b4;n = N( 1)n
 
N 1
n

.
Similarly, we derive the CDF of v1n as
Fv1n (x) =1 
N 1X
n=0
b4;n


 + n
e 
x
1
+

1
n+ 1
  
 + n

e 
(n+1)x


: (47)
Using (41), (46), and (47) the CDF of Z is given by
FZ (z) = Pr [min(umn ; v1n + w1m) < z]
= 1  Pr [umn  z]  Pr [v1n + w1m  z] : (48)
Note that Pr [umn  z] = 1   Fumn (z) can be easily
obtained using (46). Therefore, Pr [v1n + w1m  z] is cal-
culated as
Pr [v1n + w1m  z] = 1  Pr [v1n + w1m < z]
= 1 
Z z
0
Fv1n (z   w1m)fw1m (w1m)dw1m : (49)
Applying (41) and (47) into (49) we are able to obtain
Pr [v1n + w1m  z]. This leads to the analytical CDF of
Z, as shown in (24) in Theorem 2. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
By applying the approximation of e x ' 1   x for small
value of jxj into (36) and (39), we obtain the asymptotic
FZ1m(z) as
FZ1m(z) '
 z

N
; (50)
for z < v1 and
FZ1m(z) '
 z

N
+
z   v1
"1
; (51)
for z  v1. Then the asymptotic CDF of Z1 is derived as
FZ1(z) '
Z z
0
 z

N
+
z   v1
"1
M
fv1(v1)dv1
+
Z 1
z
 z

MN
fv1(v1)dv1
'
Z z
0
 z

N
+
z   v1
"1
M
fv1(v1)dv1 +
 z

MN
:
(52)
By applying the asymptotic fv1(x) ' Nx
N 1
N1
into (52) and
then solving the resultant integral, we obtain the asymptotic
CDF of Z1 as shown in (27) of Theorem 3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
By using Taylor’s series approximation of e x 'PN
n=0
( x)n
n! into (46) and (47), we obtain the asymptotic
CDFs of umn and v1n as
Fumn (x) '

x

N
1
+ 1
; (53)
and
Fv1n (x) '

x

N

+ 1
; (54)
respectively, with the aid of [47, Eq. (0.154.3), (0.154.4)].
From (48), we then derive the asymptotic CDF of Z as
FZ (z) ' 1 
 
1 

x

N
1
+ 1
!
Pr [v1n + w1m  z] :
(55)
We note that the asymptotic Pr [v1n + w1m  z] in (55) is
computed as
Pr [v1n + w1m  z] = 1 
Z z
0
Fv1n (z   w)fw1m (w)dw
' 1  
+ 1
Z z
0

z   w

N
fw1m (w)dw
= 1  z
M+N
N"M1
M
+ 1
NX
n=0
( 1)n

N
n

1
M + n
; (56)
where the asymptotic PDF fw1m (x) ' M"M1 x
M 1 is applied
to obtain the last equality. Combining the results in (55) and
(56), we obtain the asymptotic CDF of Z as shown in (31) of
Theorem 4.
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